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CRITIQUE OF SIEMENS v. SCHENKER:




T HE SIEMENS V. SCHENKER1 case was the first in the world
to have considered in any comprehensive manner the
meaning and application of the limitation of liability clause
(Clause 4) in the International Federation of Freight Fowarders
Association's (FIATA) International Air Transport Association
(IATA) standard form air waybill. The industry worldwide was
waiting for an answer of substance from the High Court of
Australia.
Instead, we were given only two opinions from each of the two
dissenting judges (Acting Chief Justice (A.CJ.) McHugh and
Justice Kirby) that provided us with any comprehensive and sub-
stantive analysis of the clause and its meaning.2
The majority opinion provided no more than four pages of
substance dealing with Clause 4 and its meaning - an analysis
that can only be described as severely brief, superficial and
wrong.
Kirby commented on the superficiality of the majority's analy-
sis, stating: "A quick reading of the conditions of contract in the
air waybill might lead to the conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeal and now by a majority of this Court."4
The problem with Clause 4 of the bill is that the air transport
industry worldwide (including lawyers and courts alike) has
given the clause the "quick read" for so long that it has been
accepted universally as correct, so that the bill continues to be
I Siemens Ltd. v. Schenker Int'l Pty (Austl.) Ltd. (2004) 216 C.L.R, 418.
2 See id. at 423-42, 454-72.
See id. at 442-54.
4 Id. at 459 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
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used as the sole instrument of protection for carriers in circum-
stances where it really provides none at all.5
II. THE FACTS & ISSUES
Very briefly, the case involved the dropping of computer
equipment from the back of a truck that was in transit approxi-
mately one kilometer outside Melbourne Airport, on its way to
Schenker Australia's customs-bonded store, approximately four
kilometers from the airport confines.6  Negligence was
admitted.7
The High Court held unanimously that the Amended Warsaw
Convention did not apply to this incident, as its provisions did
not extend to the road carriage beyond the airport boundary.'
This meant that Schenker Germany could not rely on the limita-
tion of liability provisions in the Convention to reduce its liabil-
ity.' Therefore, Schenker Germany and its Australian
representative, Schenker Australia, sought to rely on Clause 4 of
Schenker Germany's house air waybill to limit their liability. 10
The primary issues of the case, then, were:
1. Did the word "carriage" in the limitation of liability clause
(Clause 4) mean "air carriage" as defined by the Warsaw Con-
vention and Amended Warsaw Convention ("the Conven-
tions"), thus restricting the limitation's application to the air
carriage period and preventing its application to the road car-
riage outside the airport?1
2. Did the terms of the air waybill operate after delivery at the
airport of destination, i.e., to the road carriage outside the
airport?12
5 See id.
6 Id. at 425 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 442 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting); id. at 447 (Majority); id. at 458
(Kirby, J., dissenting).
9 See id. at 458.
10 See id.
n Id. at 423 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting).
12 Id.
394
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. THE MAJORITY'S INTERPRETATION OF "CARRIAGE"
IN CLAUSE 4
Except as otherwise provided in carrier's tariffs or conditions of
carriage, in carriage to which the Warsaw Convention does not apply
carriers' liability shall not exceed USD 20.00 or the equivalent per
kilogram of goods lost, damaged or delayed, unless a higher
value is declared by the shipper and a supplementary charge
paid. "'
As the Warsaw Convention only applies to air carriage (i.e.,
aboard an aircraft or within airport confines or other landing
place), a "quick read" of Clause 4 will result in the conclusion
many have assumed for many years (including now the majority
of the High Court of Australia), that the US $20-per-kilogram
limitation applies because road carriage beyond the airport is
carriage to which the Warsaw Convention does not apply.'4
This is simple and seems at first glance reasonable. This was
Schenkers' case and it has been applied for years. It is a simplis-
tic approach, which was adopted by the majority.15 The majority
stated:
cl. 4 itself operates only in respect of carriage to which the War-
saw Convention does not apply. In so providing, the waybill con-
templates a disjunction between carriage to which the Warsaw
Convention applies (international carriage by air) and carriage
which is governed solely by the terms of the waybill. It mustfollow
that "carriage" in clause 4 has a meaning different from that contained
in Art 18 of the Warsaw Convention.1 6
This conclusion lacks any proper foundation.
First, Clause 4 says nothing as to the meaning of "carriage"
covered by the bill. 7 Yet, the majority's conclusion is derived
from their description of a "disjunction," where they implicitly
assume that the word "carriage" already has a wider meaning
than air carriage. 8 In so doing, the majority is effectively giving
meaning to the word "carriage" in order to arrive at a conclu-
sion as to its meaning. This is an illogical approach.
13 Id. at 458 (Kirby, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
14 See id. at 459.
15 See id. at 449 (majority opinion).
16 Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
17 See id. at 449.
18 See id.
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Second, there is no doubt that there is a disjunction between
the meaning of carriage covered by the Warsaw Convention
("International Carriage" as defined by article 1 of the Conven-
tion) and other carriage under the bill."9 However, it is not cor-
rect to conclude that this disjunction means that the other
"carriage" has a different meaning to that covered by article 18
of the Warsaw Convention (i.e., air carriage).20 This is because
there is "carriage" to which the Warsaw Convention does not
apply but which is "carriage by air" under article 18.21 That is:
(a) domestic carriage by air, and
(b) carriage by air between states that are not both signatories
to the Wairsaw Convention. 22
Both these carriages are air carriage as defined by article 18 of
the Conventions, but they are not carriage to which the Warsaw
Convention applies because they are not "International Car-
riage" as defined by article 1 of the Conventions.23
Therefore, it is clear that the presence of the disjunction is
not to distinguish between carriage under article 18 and any
other "carriage" under the bill, but to distinguish between air
carriage that is covered by the Warsaw Convention and air car-
riage that is not (i.e., that which falls within the definition of
"International Carriage" under the Warsaw Convention and that
which does not).
This can only be properly understood by reviewing all the
clauses of the bill, the history and purpose for which the bill was
drafted, its relationship with the Warsaw Convention and the im-
pact that these factors have on the meaning of the words and
phrases in the bill when read as a whole. It is only through such
a thorough analysis that the document can be read with any
sense and consistency. This was an exercise that each of the dis-
senting judges addressed comprehensively, but which the brief
majority judgment fails to tackle.
19 See id.
20 See id. at 449.
21 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Carriage by Air art. 18, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [here-
inafter Warsaw Convention].
22 See id.
23 See id. arts. 1, 18.
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B. THE MAJORITY JUDGMENT DID NOT CONSIDER THE HISTORY
AND PURPOSE OF THE BILL TOGETHER WITH THE
CLAUSES OF THE BILL WHICH USE THE
WORD "CARRIAGE"
1. History & Purpose
The first IATA bill was drafted in 1931 shortly following the
introduction of the Warsaw Convention in 1929.24 IATA was
aware that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to all air
carriage.
As previously indicated, the Warsaw Convention only applies
to "International Carriage," which by definition excludes (1) air
carriage between states that were not both signatories to the
Convention and (2) domestic air carriage.25
IATA, therefore, recognized that it was necessary to introduce
a contractual document that mirrored the provisions of the War-
saw Convention to ensure that the same levels of responsibility
and liability would apply to all air carriage (Warsaw and non-
Warsaw), thereby ensuring uniformity and certainty.2' The Con-
vention also required that a bill be issued together with appro-
priate details, including notification that its liability provisions
may apply, an indication of the places of departure and destina-
tion, etc.2 7
2. "Disjunction" and Purpose of Clause 4
With this background, it becomes clear that the "carriage" to
which the Warsaw Convention does not apply in Clause 4 is re-
ally non-Warsaw air carriage - this is the real disjunction that the
Majority fails to grasp, that between Warsaw air carriage and
non-Warsaw air carriage.28
Clause 4's intended purpose is, without doubt, to apply the
same limitation of liability to non-Warsaw air carriage as that
24 1 SIIAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT: AIR LAW, 1031-40 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter
SHAWCROSS].
25 Warsaw Convention, supra note 21, art. 1.
26 SHAWCROSS, supra note 24 (reciting each clause of the IATA bill and noting
which provisions of the Conventions each clause reflects); Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at
461-63, 465 (Kirby, J., dissenting) (stating how the provisions of JATA bill mirror
the provisions of the Warsaw Convention).
27 Warsaw Convention, supra note 21, art. 8 as provided in cl. 2.1 of the IATA
bill; Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at 461-63 (providing an interesting analysis on the pur-
pose of the IATA bill).
28 See Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at 450.
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provided to Warsaw air carriage (clearly reflected by the US $20
being the equivalent amount under the original Convention).29
This intention becomes abundantly clear when reviewing the
clauses that actually use the word "carriage" and the inclusion in
those clauses of the phrase "other services."
3. The Meaning of "Carriage" as Used in the Clauses of the Bill
The majority's conclusion.that "carriage" can include non-air
carriage requires the same word to have different meanings in
the same document.3 ° That is inconsistent with the structure of
the document and, in particular, the following provisions:
Clause 1 defines carrier as "all air carriers that carry or undertake
to carry the goods hereunder or perform any other services inci-
dental to such air carriage."31 The reference to "such air car-
riage" relates the phrase "air carriage" back to "carry or
undertake to carry," which indicates that "carry ... hereunder" is
carrying by air.12 Also, it is noted that the act of carrying is differ-
entiated from the "other services" performed incidental to such
air carriage. 3
Clause 2.1 is the clause that effectively defines "carriage here-
under. 13 4 It states: "Carriage hereunder is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by the Warsaw Convention unless
such carriage is not "international carriage" as defined by that
Convention. 35
Whilst the majority judgment recognizes that "carriage"
under the bill is relevantly carriage of the goods hereunder (i.e.,
pursuant to the terms of the waybill), it fails to go to Clause 2.1,
which effectively defines "carriage hereunder. ' 36 It instead goes
to Clause 11, which makes no mention of carriage but deals with
the concept of delivery. 7
Kirby, on the other hand, correctly recognized the impor-
tance of Clause 2.1 in defining "carriage" under the bill:
29 See id. at 465 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 450 (majority opinion).
31 IATA Resolution 600B (II) Air Waybill - Conditions of Contract, cl. 1.
32 Id. at cl. 2.
33 Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at 437 (McHugh, A.CJ., dissenting); id. at 463 (Kirby, J.,
dissenting).
34 IATA Resolution 600B (1I) Air Waybill - Conditons of Contract, cl. 2.
35 Id.
36 Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at 450.
37 Id.
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In cl 2.1 a definition of "carriage" is given. The purpose is made
clear by the opening words, "[c]arriage hereunder." By this
phrase, the drafter indicates that, whenever "carriage" is used in
the air waybill, it is to take the meaning indicated in cl 2.1. Very
clear language would be required to expand, or alter, this ex-
press definition. Further, the words used are only really apt to
apply to air carriage. The distinction in cl 2.1 between carriage
subject to the Warsaw Convention and otherwise is not between
air carriage and carriage by truck, car, ship, barge, horse, camel
or donkey. It is between "international carriage" by air as de-
fined by the Warsaw Convention and other "carriage" by air
which, by the terms of the Convention, is outside its
application.
Kirby and McHugh further recognized that Clause 2.1 is a re-
hash of article 8q of the Warsaw Convention, where the word
"carriage" can only mean air carriage because article 31 of the
Convention states that its provisions only apply to carriage by
air."' Treating "carriage hereunder" as anything other than air
carriage would render road transport subject to the rules of lia-
bility under the Convention, contrary to article 31.40 The IATA
bill was intended to reflect the provisions of the Conventions,
not contradict them. 4' The fact that Clause 2.1 does not refer to
"other services" also confirms that it is intended to be restricted
to carriage by air, as distinct from other services incidental to
such air carriage, such as road carriage, for the purpose of load-
ing, transshipment or delivery.42
Clause 2.2 provides that (to the extent not in conflict with the
rules relating to liability established by the Conventions) car-
riage hereunder (under the air waybill) and other services per-
formed by each air carrier are subject to applicable laws and
provisions of the waybill (Clauses 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).41 "Carriage,"
again, is differentiated from other services performed by each air
38 See id. at 464 (Kirby, J., dissenting). This is the same disjunction referred to
in Clause 4 which the majority noticed but got wrong. Id. at 432-34 (McHugh,
A.CJ., dissenting) (recognizing that Clause 2.1 and 4 have the same holistic lan-
guage and when read together indicate that the liability regimes under the War-
saw Convention and the bill operate exclusively of each other so that when the
carriage (by air) is "International Carriage" the provisions relating to liability
under the Warsaw Convention apply (Clause 2.1) and when not, Clause 4 does).
19 Id. at 437 (McHugh, A.CJ., dissenting); id. at 464 (Kirby, J. dissenting).
40 See id. at 464 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 437 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting); id. at 464-65 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
42 See id. at 465 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
43 IATA Resolution 600B (II) Air Waybill - Conditions of Contract, cl.2.2,
2.2.1, 2.2.2.
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carriage." Consistently, the phrase "carriage hereunder" must
have the same meaning as in clauses 1 and 2.1.45
Clause 7 refers to when an aircraft is used by a carrier for
carriage. 4' An aircraft is not used for any carriage but air
47carriage.
Clause 8.1 uses the term "other means of transportation" to
refer to non-air carriage. 48 This supports the proposition that
where "carriage" is used it means air carriage and that "carriage
hereunder" is air carriage under the air waybill.4 9
4. Other Services Incidental to the Carriage
Most importantly, however, is the fact that both clauses 1 and
2.2 speak clearly of "carriage" and "other services," whilst Clause
4 does not.50
Both McHugh and Kirby agreed that the differentiation be-
tween carriage (by air) and other services (incidental to such
carriage) reflects the terms of articles 18.2 and 18.3 of the Con-
ventions, which deal with "carriage by air," distinguishing it
from land elements for the purpose of loading, delivery, or
transshipment in the performance of a contract for carriage by
air.5'
The bill recognizes, like the Conventions in articles 1, 18, and
31, that a contract for air carriage may include these land ele-
ments. However, like the Conventions, they are not "carriage"
but rather incidental to it. This is why both McHugh and Kirby
noted that even if one argued that the bill could apply to the
44 Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at 465 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 437 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
46 IATA Resolution 600B (II) Air Waybill - Conditions of Contract, cl. 7.
47 Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at 437 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting).
48 Id. cl.8.1.
49 See Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at 435-37 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting).
5o See id. at 437 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting); id. at 463 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 463 (Kirby, J., dissenting); id. at 436-37 (McHugh, A.CJ., dissenting).
McHugh made one slight error when he states that Siemens contended that ser-
vices incidental to air carriage would include tasks such as loading and unloading
the cargo at the airport, loading the cargo into and unloading the cargo from the
aircraft and moving the cargo by truck around the aerodrome. Id. at 436 (Mc-
Hugh, A.C.J., dissenting). This was in fact the incorrect conclusion reached by
BarrettJ. in the Court at First Instance. Id. at 437. Siemens actually contended,
as McHugh correctly held, that incidental services were confined to land ele-
ments such as loading, unloading, and transshipment, as reflected by articles 18.2
and 18.3 of the Amended Convention. See id. The services referred to by Barrett
J. in the Court at First Instance clearly fall within "air carriage." Id. at 437.
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bonded store, the road carriage was at best an "other service"
incidental to the carriage under the bill.
Since Clause 4 does not apply to "other services," but is re-
stricted in application to "carriage" by air, the dissenting judges
correctly held that the Schenker companies could not rely on
Clause 4 to limit their liability to the road carriage outside the
airport confines. -2
C. MAJORITY'S CONFUSED ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND ISSUE
1. The Majority Failed to Distinguish Between the Operation of the
Bill and the Operation of the Wider Agreement,
Richtungsverkehr
The majority's error in its interpretation of the word "car-
riage" under the bill, as noted above, resulted from its confused
interpretation of Clause 11 of the bill. Clause 11, relevantly, was
quoted by the majority, but its meaning not explained by them:
Notice of arrival of goods will be given promptly to the consignee
or to the person indicated on the face hereof as the person to be
notified. On arrival of the goods at the place of destination, subject to
the acceptance of other instructions from the shipper prior to arrival of the
goods at the place of destination, delivery will be made to, or in accor-
dance with the instructions of the consignee. If the consignee declines
to accept the goods or cannot be communicated with, disposi-
tion will be in accordance with instructions of the shipper.53
Schenker argued that delivery pursuant to the bill was to be
made to Siemens at the customs bonded store because this is
what the parties agreed pursuant to their wider agreement, the
Richtungsverkehr ("direct traffic agreement"), and that is what
customs regulations mandated.5 4 Siemens did not dispute this.
Siemens embraced this. 55
Importantly, however, Siemens argued that whilst the Rich-
tungsverkehr and customs regulations contemplated delivery at
the bonded store, the terms of the air waybill did not refer to
any such place of destination but rather Melbourne Airport.5 6
The bill worked within the wider agreement.
52 See id. at 437, 442 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting); id. at 465, 471 (Kirby, J.,
dissenting).
53 Id. at 450 (majority opinion).
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To the extent that any domestic laws (such as customs regula-
tions) apply, they do so within the parameters of the contract at
hand: in the case of the bill, between the place of departure and
the place of destination stated on the bill.57 The extent that
they apply outside the bill (i.e., beyond the place of destination)
is dependent on the existence of a wider agreement. In this
case, there was a wider agreement that contemplated de-consoli-
dation and delivery of the goods to Siemens at the bonded store,
thus bringing the customs regulations into effect."8 The off-air-
port de-consolidation, customs clearance and delivery services
worked hand-in-hand with the customs regulations to require
the goods' immediate removal to these locations so that these
services could be performed as agreed.59
It is illogical to suggest, as the majority did, that Clause 2.2.1
of the bill, which incorporates by reference applicable laws,
would apply and incorporate domestic laws to services that are
provided beyond the place of destination of the bill.6"
Clause 11 and the concept of delivery at the airport can be
interpreted sensibly without any extension of the terms to the
bonded store (i.e., delivery to a road carrier, Schenker Australia,
at the airport pursuant to the instructions of the consignee to
effect the terms of the wider agreement). 6
McHugh and Kirby carefully distinguished between the opera-
tion and ambit of the wider agreement and that of the bill.6 2
The bill could only operate within the purview of its terms. The
bill never dealt with a place of destination other than that which
appeared on the face of the bill (Melbourne Airport), and Sie-
mens' submissions in relation to the meaning of Clause 11 were
consistent with this analysis.63
McHugh followed Siemens' submissions, which carefully dis-
sected the meaning of Clausell, and stated:
57 See id. at 442 (holding that the customs mandate did not operate within the




61 See id. at 441.
62 See id. at 460-66 (Kirby, J., dissenting); id. at 439-42 (McHugh, A.C.J.,
dissenting).
63 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 21, art. 8 (mandating that the places of
departure and destination be marked on the air waybill). The only relevant
spaces for these places in the FIATA/IATA air waybills are boxes referring to
airports of departure and destination on the face of the bills; the airports must be
these places. See Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at 441-42 (McHugh, A.C.J. . dissenting).
SIEMENS v. SCHENKER
Clause 11 does not identify "the place of destination." It is
clearly the "Airport of Destination" given on the front of the air
waybill. The word "to" in the phrase "delivery will be made to"
indicates that the issue is how and to whom delivery is to be made
at the place of destination, not where the delivery is to be made.
Clause 11 gives effect in practical terms to the provision of Arts
12 and 13 of the Amended Convention.' 4
2. The Majority Failed to Grasp the Concept of "Delivery"
Clause 11 assumes that the goods have already arrived at the
place of destination, i.e., Melbourne Airport.6 5 It deals with the
concept of delivery as the disposition of the goods to a person at
that place, not delivery as a concept of transport to an additional
place beyond the place of destination.6 6 It is not possible to
have two places of destination under the bill.
The majority judgment not only fails to distinguish between
the operation of the bill and the operation of the wider agree-
ment between the parties, but it also fails to correctly distinguish
between "delivery" as a concept of disposition of goods (as it is
used in Clause 11 and the Warsaw Convention) and "delivery "
as a concept of transport. This is evidenced by its conclusion,
after quoting Clause 11 without explanation as to its meaning:
"It follows that delivery to the Schenker Australia bonded ware-
house was contemplated by Siemens Germany, the Schenker
companies and, most importantly, Siemens Australia in its ca-
pacity as consignee."6 7 The reference to "delivery to the . . .
warehouse" indicates that the Majority has not understood the
concept of delivery under Clause 11.
As already stated, Clause 11 (like articles 12 and 13 of the
Warsaw Convention) does not talk of delivery to another place,
because the clause begins with the premise that the goods have
already arrived at the place of destination."8 It talks, as McHugh
correctly recognizes, of delivery being the disposition of goods
to a person - the consignee or some other party at the con-
64 Id. at 441 (emphasis added). Clause 11 gives effect in practical terms to the
legal provisions in articles 12 and 13 of the Convention. SRAwcRoss, supra note
24, at 1031-40. Clause 11 determines the rights of the consignor and consignee
as against the carrier in relation to delivery (i.e. disposition) of the goods to a
person, not carriage to another place.
65 See Siemens, 216 C.L.R. at 441 (McHugh, A.CJ., dissenting).
66 See id. at 441 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting).
67 See id. at 450-51 (majority opinion).
68 See id. at 441 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting).
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signee's instruction, i.e., in this case, the road carrier, Schenker
Australia, who was to take the goods from Melbourne airport to
the customs bonded store, consistent with the terms of the wider
agreement and customs regulations.69
D. THE MAJORITY INTERTWINED AND CONFUSED THE Two MAIN
ISSUES OF THE CASE
The most glaring error, however, was that the majority, after
conflating the operation of the wider agreement with the opera-
tion of the bill and confusing the meaning of "delivery," then
mistakenly relied on the "Clause 11 and customs regulations"
analysis to determine the meaning of "carriage" under the
bill.7 °
In other words, the majority's judgment applied Schenkers'
"Clause 11 and customs regulations" arguments, which related
to whether the bill's terms extended beyond the airport (the
second issue of the case) to determine the meaning of the word
"carriage" (the first issue of the case).71 This is despite the fact
that neither Clause 11 nor the customs regulations make any
mention of, or deal with, the word "carriage" as it is used in the
bill.72
When determining the meaning of "carriage" under the bill,
the Majority stated: "Importantly, the terms of the waybill pro-
vided for the transportation of goods other than through car-
riage by air. This is made clear by cl 11 which provides as
follows . . .;" and then the majority quotes Clause 11 with no
explanation as to its meaning.7 Clearly, the majority is incor-
rectly interpreting the meaning of "delivery" in Clause 1 1 as a
concept of transport rather than disposition of goods. This is
likely the cause of its error, particularly since the clause makes
absolutely no reference to the word "carriage. 74
Kirby and McHugh were not so confused and noted that, even
if one accepted that Clause 11 and the customs regulations ex-
tended the operation of the bill to the bonded store, the trans-
port from the airport to this point was not "carriage" as referred
to in the bill.75 If transport to the bonded store was contem-
69 See id.
70 See id. at 450-51 (majority).
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 450.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 441 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
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plated by the bill, it would at best be a service incidental to the
"carriage" under the bill for the purpose of delivery.7" As such,
it was not covered by the Clause 4 limitation that applied to "car-
riage" only.77
Kirby and McHugh came to this conclusion because they had
already explored the other clauses of the bill that refer to the
word "carriage."7 They had properly and comprehensively con-
sidered these in light of the bill's history, purpose and its rela-
tionship with the Warsaw Convention to accurately determine
the meaning of "carriage. ''79 The majority made no mention of
these considerations.8 0 They are, in fact, the most important
submissions of the case.
E. THE MAJORITY REFERRED TO No RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY
Whilst the comprehensive judgments of both McHugh and
Kirby relied on international authority, including numerous
leading international texts dealing with the IATA air waybill and
its relationship with the Warsaw Convention, the majority re-
ferred to none.8'
Whilst McHugh and Kirby went to great lengths in explaining
why the foreign cases on which Schenker attempted to rely were
inapplicable, the majority did not deal with these cases at all,
nor explain why the cases on which Siemens relied were
inapplicable .82
The majority referred briefly (without substantive explana-
tion) to two U.S. cases that simply applied Clause 4 in circum-
stances of losses outside airport confines, but that neither dealt
with the meaning of Clause 4 nor the word "carriage" as used in
Clause 4.3
IV. CONCLUSION
Both dissenting judges, McHugh and Kirby, who found in fa-
vour of Siemens, were prepared to analyse both Siemens' and
76 See id.
77 See id. at 438 (McHugh, A.CJ., dissenting); id. at 466 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
78 See id. at 435-38 (McHugh, A.C.J., dissenting); id. at 463-65 (Kirby, J.,
dissenting).
79 See id.
8o See id. at 442-54 (majority opinion).
"I See generally id. at 418-72.
112 See generally id.
s3 See id. at 453-54 (majority opinion).
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Schenkers' submissions and comment on the merits, or lack
thereof, of both.
Remarkably, however, the majority judgment:
" failed to deal with the bulk of Siemens' submissions,
" failed to consider Clause 4 in context with all the other clauses
of the bill that used the word "carriage" and
" failed to consider the purpose for which the bill was drafted.
It is not an overstatement to say that the majority's judgment
ignores basic interpretational principles of contract law.
Quoting Lord Steyn, Kirby remarked that in the law "context
is everything. '8 4 He stresses that "contested words must never be
construed in isolation. They take their meaning from their con-
text and their purpose.""5 It is these basic interpretational prin-
cipals that should be applied in the legal analysis of any
contractual document. However, it is clear that the majority's
judgment failed enormously in this application.
84 Id. at 460 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
85 Id.
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